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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1622 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL R. SHIELDS, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-01048) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 26, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed:  August 17, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Michael R. Shields appeals, pro se, the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint 
for failure to prosecute.  Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial 
question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
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In December 2010, Shields filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against 
the Commissioner of Social Security.  Shields sought judicial review pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner’s denial of his request for Social Security benefits. 
On July 25, 2011, the District Court issued an order directing Shields to file a motion and 
brief for summary judgment within forty-five days.  Shields did not comply, and on 
October, 5, 2011, the District Court issued an order to show cause why the cause of 
action should not be dismissed.  Shields filed a one-paragraph response in which he 
stated that his health was declining and complaining of numerous ailments.  On January 
9, 2012, the District Court directed Shields to file a brief as to why summary judgment 
should not be granted.  Shields filed another one-paragraph response, stating that he 
“should be able to get some help with [his] life,” and complaining of illness.  On 
February 8, 2012, the District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.  Shields 
filed a timely notice appeal. 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court may dismiss an 
action sua sponte if a plaintiff fails to prosecute his case.  See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 
370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).  We review a decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute for 
an abuse of discretion.  See Briscoe v. Klaus
Dismissal for failure to prosecute may be appropriately invoked only after analysis 
of several factors, including:  (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the 
prejudice to the opposing party; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the party acted 
willfully or in bad faith; (5) alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim 
, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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or defense.  Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  
While not all of the factors need be met to find dismissal is warranted, dismissal is a 
sanction of last resort.  Hicks v. Feeney
 Applying these factors, we do not see any prejudice to the Commissioner resulting 
from Shield’s failure to prosecute given that the record is complete and the parties need 
only file summary judgment motions before the district court rules on the merits.  
Additionally, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Shield’s inaction was in bad 
faith or that the District Court considered alternative sanctions.   
, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). 
However, Shields, who is proceeding pro se, is personally responsible for failing 
to prosecute his case.  Shields has also shown a history of dilatoriness.  He did not 
comply with the court’s order directing him to file a motion for summary judgment.  His 
only responses to the court’s order to show cause and second memorandum order 
directing him to file a brief on summary judgment were single paragraph responses 
complaining of ill health.   
 It is somewhat difficult to evaluate the meritoriousness of his claim because 
Shields never filed a brief.  The District Court did review the Administrative Law Judge’s 
decision, which acknowledged Shields’s medical impairments, but discredited his 
cardiologist’s opinion that Shields could not work.  The District Court noted that Shields 
had reported that he could walk for one hour a day and could lift up to twenty pounds.  
The court also considered that Shields had injured his leg playing basketball after 
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reporting that he was disabled.  The District Court concluded that the record demonstrates 
substantial evidence that Shields could have performed available light sedentary work. 
Shields’s personal responsibility for the failure to prosecute, his history of 
dilatoriness, and the apparent lack of merit in his claim weigh in favor of dismissal.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice.  Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
